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Abstract
Conventional economic models of regulatory compliance focus on an instrumental deter-
mination of individual behaviour in which the decision to comply or violate depends upon
the perceived monetary costs and benefits. This suggests that compliance can only be
achieved by ensuring that the expected costs are greater than the expected benefits, in other
words by employing a deterrent effect. The policy implication is that desired levels of
compliance must be achieved through enforcement, which is costly. More complete mod-
els of compliance behaviour take into account non-monetary factors such as social
influences, moral norms and the perceived "legitimacy" of regulations and the regulatory
authority. The paper describes a current investigation into the influence of non-monetary
factors in determining compliance with quota restrictions among UK fishermen and dis-
cusses some preliminary results from the study.
Introduction
If fishery management regulations are to achieve their intended objectives, compliance is
crucial. To the extent that quota limits are violated, for example, agreed TACs and desired
levels of fishing mortality will be exceeded. Economic approaches to fisheries manage-
ment, designed to correct market failure in the exploitation of fishery resources, also
require compliance in order to be effective: quantitative rights-based systems such as ITQs,
for example, depend for their success upon respect for individual quota holdings (eg.
Squires et al 1995). Where incentives exist to violate regulations, considerable resources
may have to be devoted to enforcement. Within the European Community, for example,
the total annual cost of monitoring and enforcement is estimated to be around ECU 300
million (Commission of the European Communities 1997). It is often difficult, however, to
measure the extent of violation and hence the productive value of enforcement expenditure
(Sutinen and Hennessey 1986).
1 This work was funded by DGXIV of the European Commission (Study no. 96/090).
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In comparison with the extensive literature on the design and implementation of fish-
eries management instruments and policies, relatively little attention has been paid to the
question of compliance and enforcement. Most economic studies of the enforcement prob-
lem in fisheries have moreover been theoretical rather than empirical, focusing on the
impact of costly and imperfect enforcement on optimal levels of exploitation in a regulated
fishery (eg. Sutinen and Andersen 1985, Milliman 1986) and on the selection of efficient
regulatory instruments (eg. Anderson and Lee 1986, Anderson 1989, Mazany et al 1994
) 1.
In these analyses, and in some empirical studies as well (see below), individual
agents are implicitly assumed to make the rational decision to comply or violate according
to a narrow utility function in which the anticipated benefits of illegal activity are directly
compared to the anticipated costs (as a function of the subjective probability of detection
and prosecution and the likely fine). In other words, a simple deterrence model of violation
behaviour is employed, of the type originally formulated by Becker (1968)
2
. Although
such models do not require that all agents have an equal propensity to violate under a given
set of conditions, the fact that non-monetary influences over behaviour are effectively ig-
nored means that aggregate changes in levels of compliance (or in the 'supply of
violations') can be related only to changes in the costs and benefits of illegal behaviour.
The implications for policy can therefore be formulated only in terms of marginal changes
in the probability of detection and prosecution (ie. the level of enforcement effort) and/or
changes in the severity of sanctions in order to increase deterrence.
Empirical studies on individuals’ compliance with fishery regulations have been re-
ported by Sutinen and Gauvin (1989), Furlong (1991) and Kuperan and Sutinen (1995).
Both Sutinen and Gauvin (1989) and Furlong (1991) explicitly recognise factors other than
those directly related to the costs and benefits of violation in the determination of compli-
ance behaviour, but their influence is not fully explored. Furlong (1991) includes in his
theoretical compliance model a vector of variables to capture "personal and household"
characteristics. In his estimation of the model using data from a survey of Quebec fisher-
men he includes variables for age, the proportion of the family currently unemployed and
the proportion of family income derived from fishing: these are designed to serve as prox-
ies for individual differences in "tastes" such as attitudes and proclivities towards violation.
Sutinen and Gauvin (1989), in their study of compliance in the inshore lobster fishery of
Massachusetts, similarly hypothesise that the incentive to violate is influenced by personal
characteristics such as age, years in the fishery and income dependence.
Sutinen and Kuperan (1995) note that conventional deterrence models do not ade-
quately explain relatively high observed levels of compliance (eg. Sutinen et al 1990) nor
do they convey realistic policy prescriptions with their focus on the quantity of (costly) en-
forcement. Implicitly building upon the broader set of 'bases' of compliance proposed by
Young (1979) (see Sutinen et al 1990), these authors develop an extended model to include
social influence and moral obligation alongside the standard monetary incentive and deter-
rence factors. A moral obligation to comply is considered to depend on the individual’s
level of 'moral development' and the legitimacy accorded to the regulation and to the
1 See Mazany (1993) for a review.
2 See, for example, Pyle (1983) for a review.
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regulatory agency. Kuperan and Sutinen (1995) use this model to examine compliance
with fisheries zoning regulations in Malaysia. From an analysis of survey data they con-
cluded that non-monetary factors are important in determining levels of compliance, which
cannot therefore be explained entirely in terms of a rational cost-benefit calculus.
The present study was designed to examine the importance of non-monetary factors
in determining compliance with quantitative landings restrictions (quota limits) among
fishermen in the United Kingdom. We were specifically interested in whether the sort of
findings reported by Kuperan and Sutinen (1995) might be observed in the complex politi-
cal and regulatory environment of a European fishery, and in particular in the extent to
which perceptions of the legitimacy of the regulations and the regulatory authorities might
have a measurable impact on levels of compliance.
We will leave to one side the question of the 'correct' economic interpretation of non-
monetary factors, although their incorporation into a neoclassical utility function is not
straightforward. Etzioni (1988), for example, argues that while moral norms and self-
interest may act together to determine an individual’s actions, they should be considered in
terms of two entirely separate and irreducible utilities (in the extreme, morality may be
thought of as tightly constraining the choices which an individual may make). Sutinen and
Kuperan (1995) provide a short discussion of the definition of morality and social influ-
ence in the compliance context from the perspective of other disciplines, including
psychology and sociology. Sociological theories of compliance, for example, include both
instrumental models (equivalent to neoclassical deterrence models in economics but more
readily incorporating informal sanctions such as peer group pressures) and normative mod-
els which focus on personal morality and on legitimacy - the belief that the law ought to be
obeyed (Tyler 1990).
Modern views of legitimacy begin with Weber (1947) (see Sternberger 1968) and
suggest that acceptance of the legitimacy of an authority will encourage compliance with
its laws even where those laws conflict with individuals’ own self-interest. In other words,
legitimacy represents a perceived obligation to obey that is necessarily linked to political
authority and is distinct from the influence of moral norms (indeed personal morality and
legitimacy may conflict). The separation between legitimacy, morality and self-interest,
however, is not an easy one, nor is legitimacy a singular or absolute concept. To the extent
that legitimacy is enduring it may approach the normative status of morality, for example,
whereas legitimacy judged contemporaneously in terms of outcome (see below) may in
some cases be said simply to reflect self-interest (Tyler 1990).
Our approach to investigating the role of legitimacy is based on that employed by
Tyler (1990) in his 'Chicago study' of US citizens’ compliance with the law. Legitimacy is
assessed with primary reference to a particular regulation and the regulatory system rather
than to an authority in general terms, so that the obligation to comply is measured more or
less directly. Where appropriate, attention is focused separately on process and outcome
and on fairness and efficiency (or effectiveness): in other words, is the regulation effec-
tively and fairly enforced, and is the regulation itself effective and fair in the results it
produces? Like Kuperan and Sutinen (1995) we attempt to construct an econometric model
to explain the observed pattern of compliance in terms of a number of non-monetary vari-
ables.
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Data collection
The study population was the fishing industry of the X region of England,
1
 including all
vessels of over 10m in length and subject to quota restrictions. Vessels of 10m or under in
length were excluded, since these are not normally subject to quota restrictions under the
UKs quota management system. Vessels of over 10m which do not target quota species
were also excluded. Three sub-populations were identified: vessels belonging to producers’
organisation A, those belonging to producers’ organisation B and vessels based in the re-
gion which do not belong to a producers’ organisation (so-called 'non-sector' vessels).
Sampling was done on a stratified random basis within each sub-population. PO vessels
were stratified by vessel size (10-20m and over 20m) and by fishing method while the
smaller number of non-sector vessels was stratified by size only. The final sample size and
composition is summarised in table 1 below.
Table 1  Sample details
Population Population size Sample size
PO A vessels 115 34 (30%)
PO B vessels 75 23 (31%)
Non-sector vessels 45 12 (27%)
All vessels 235 69 (29%)
All data were collected by means of face-to-face interviews with the skippers of the
selected vessels during the winter of 1997/98. Structured questionnaires were used in order
to record respondents’ perceptions about the effectiveness and fairness of quota restric-
tions, the effectiveness and fairness of enforcement, the authority of management
institutions, the involvement of fishermen in the management system, the compliance be-
haviour of others, personal experience of enforcement and conviction, as well as own
compliance behaviour. Additional questions were designed directly to elicit perceptions of
moral obligation to comply with quota  restrictions. The age of the skipper, his length of
involvement in the industry, his owner/employee status, the size of the vessel and its gross
annual turnover were also recorded.
It should be noted that the regulatory environments under which the non-sector and
PO vessels operate are somewhat different. Non-sector vessels must comply with the
monthly quota restrictions (set directly by the Government) which are specified in their li-
cences. PO members, on the other hand, are subject only to the restrictions imposed by
their own PO
2
. Non-sector vessels commit an offence if they land more than the quantity
1 Because of the sensitive nature of the data the study region is not identified.
2 Hatcher (1997) describes the management of quotas by producers’ organisations in the UK.
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specified in their licence within a calendar month. No such offence applies to PO members
since if they exceed their restrictions they are merely infringing the (private) rules of their
PO. In practice, however, all violations are hidden from both the Government Sea Fisheries
Inspectorate and the POs’ officers by falsifying landings declarations which are monitored
by the POs as well as by Government. Whereas the logbooks required to be kept at sea al-
low a 20% margin of error in recording quantities of fish retained on board, landings
declarations must be accurate. Despite the legalistic differences, therefore, in practice the
act of violation is the same for all vessels: violation means exceeding quota restrictions and
falsifying logbook records and/or landings declarations (certainly the latter) 
1
.
Results
Of the 69 respondents interviewed, only one refused to answer questions about his own
compliance record. Of the remaining 68 respondents, 18 (26%) stated that they did not ex-
ceed quota restrictions in the previous year, 30 (43.5%) stated that their landings were
over-quota by 10% or less, while 20 (29%) admitted that their landings had been over-
quota by a margin of 25% or more (see table 2).
Table 2 Over-quota % of landings
Response % Frequency
0% 26.1 18
10% or less 43.5 30
25% 13.0 9
50% 8.7 6
75% 5.8 4
100% 1.4 1
Refused 1.4 1
Total 100.0 69
Similarly, 18 respondents (26%) stated that none of their gross earnings in the previ-
ous year were attributable to over-quota fish, 24 (35%) stated that 1-2% of their earnings
came from over-quota landings while 26 (38%) said that 5% or more of their earnings were
due to over-quota landings (see table 3).
1 The statutory maximum penalty in UK law for submitting a false landings declaration is £50,000.
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Table 3  % gross earnings from over-quota fish
Response % Frequency
0% 26.1 18
1-2% 34.8 24
5% 10.1 7
10% 10.1 7
20% 10.1 7
30% or more 7.2 5
Refused 1.4 1
Total 100.0 69
Considering those respondents who reported no over-quota landings as compliers
and those who reported significant (ie. greater than zero) over-quota landings as violators,
the following cross-tabulations of responses to a selection of the questions provide an
overview of the results from the survey.
Probability of detection
Table 4 If you were to retain on board and land over-quota fish, what would you consider to be your
overall chances of getting caught?
Q36 Compliers Violators
Response Freq. % Freq. %
Very high (50% or more) 3 16.7 4 8.0
High (25%) 5 27.8 10 20.0
Quite possible (10%) 4 22.2 8 16.0
Moderately low (5%) 1 5.6 17 34.0
Very low (1% or less) 5 27.8 11 22.0
Legitimacy of the regulation: effectiveness
Table 5 Quota restrictions are effective in conserving fish stocks
Q1 Compliers Violators
Response Freq. % Freq. %
Agree strongly 0 0.0 1 2.0
Agree 5 27.8 5 10.0
Disagree 7 38.9 21 42.0
Disagree strongly 6 33.3 23 46.0
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Table 6 Quota restrictions would be effective if fishermen complied with them
Q2 Compliers Violators
Response Freq. % Freq. %
Agree strongly 0 0.0 3 6.0
Agree 11 61.1 15 30.0
Disagree 5 27.8 21 42.0
Disagree strongly 2 11.1 11 22.0
Legitimacy of the regulation: fairness
Table 7 Would you say that the quota restrictions that apply to your vessel are generally
Q6 Compliers Violators
Response Freq. % Freq. %
Very fair? 1 5.6 2 4.0
More fair than unfair? 5 27.8 12 24.0
Slightly unfair? 7 38.9 15 30.0
Very unfair? 5 27.8 21 42.0
Legitimacy of the regulation: respect by others
Table 8 Do you think that most, many, a sizeable minority or just a few fishermen in the region regu-
larly land over-quota fish?
Q26 Compliers Violators
Response Freq. % Freq. %
Most 3 16.7 19 38.0
Many 5 27.8 12 24.0
A sizeable minority 6 33.3 13 26.0
Just a few 4 22.2 6 12.0
Legitimacy of the regulatory process: effectiveness
Table 9 Overall, how well do you think that quota restrictions are enforced on UK vessels? Are they
Q9 Compliers Violators
Response Freq. % Freq. %
Well enforced? 5 27.8 11 22.0
Adequately enforced? 7 38.9 21 42.0
Not adequately enforced? 2 11.1 12 24.0
Hardly enforced at all? 4 22.2 6 12.0
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Legitimacy of the regulatory process: fairness
Table 10 In general, how fair do you think fishery inspectors are in deciding whether or not to inspect a
particular vessel? Would you say that the pattern of inspections is on the whole
Q15 Compliers Violators
Response Freq. % Freq. %
Fair? 14 77.8 42 84.0
Not very fair? 4 22.2 6 12.0
Very unfair? 0 0.0 2 4.0
Legitimacy of the regulatory authority
Table 11  The UK government has a duty to restrict catches because it is a member of the EU
Q19 Compliers Violators
Response Freq. % Freq. %
Agree strongly 1 5.5 0 0.0
Agree 8 44.4 25 50.0
Disagree 6 33.3 20 40.0
Disagree strongly 3 16.6 5 10.0
Involvement in the regulatory system
Table 12 How big a say do you think you have in the design and operation of the quota management
system? Are you
Q24 Compliers Violators
Response Freq. % Freq. %
Very involved? 1 5.6 3 6.0
Quite involved? 3 16.7 3 6.0
Involved a little? 4 22.2 7 14.0
Not involved? 8 44.4 31 62.0
Actively ignored? 2 11.1 6 12.0
Compliance behaviour of peers
Table 13 Considering the skippers of other vessels in your PO or other local non-sector vessels, would
you say that
Q44 Compliers Violators
Response Freq. % Freq. %
All comply with quota restrictions most of the time? 5 27.8 2 4.0
Most comply with quota restrictions most of the time? 11 61.1 17 34.0
A large minority regularly land over-quota fish? 2 11.1 9 18.0
Many regularly land over-quota fish? 0 0.0 8 16.0
Most regularly land over-quota fish? 0 0.0 14 28.0
Peer attitudes to violation
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Table 14 Among other skippers in the PO or other non-sector skippers, is landing over-quota fish gen-
erally regarded as being
Q45 Compliers Violators
Response Freq. % Freq. %
Very wrong? 1 5.6 2 4.0
Basically wrong, but understandable every so often? 2 11.1 4 8.0
Basically wrong, but an economic necessity? 10 55.5 36 72.0
Neither wrong nor right? 1 5.6 2 4.0
Fine if you can get away with it? 4 22.2 6 12.0
Moral obligation to comply
Table 15
Q47, Q49, Q50, Q51 % Compliers % Violators
Agree Disagree Agree Disagree
Quota restrictions should be complied with because they
are the law
55.6 44.4 36.0 64.0
Quota restrictions should be complied with because oth-
erwise you are taking more than your fair share
38.9 61.1 18.0 82.0
Quota restriction should be complied with even if you
think they are not effective in conserving fish stocks
38.9 61.1 26.0 74.0
Quota restrictions should be complied with even if you
think they are unfair
55.6 44.4 24.0 76.0
In summary, a descriptive analysis of the raw data suggests the following:
1. Probability of detection: Compliers perceive the probability of being caught to be
somewhat higher than do violators.
2. Legitimacy of the regulation: effectiveness: A higher proportion of compliers regard
quota restrictions as effective in conserving fish stocks, particularly in principle (ie.
if all fishermen complied with them).
3. Legitimacy of the regulation: fairness: There is little difference in the perceived fair-
ness of quota allocations under the UK’s quota management system between
compliers and violators. Most regard their allocations as more or less unfair.
4. Legitimacy of the regulation: respect by others: Compliers perceive quota restric-
tions to be respected by a slightly greater proportion of the region’s fleet.
5. Legitimacy of the regulatory process: effectiveness: There is little difference in the
perceived effectiveness of the enforcement of quota restrictions. In general the regu-
lations are considered to be adequately or well enforced.
6. Legitimacy of the regulatory process: fairness: Most respondents regard the pattern
of inspections as fair.
7. Legitimacy of the regulatory authority: Under the existing political framework, the
duty of the UK Government to restrict catches is acknowledged by around half of all
respondents.
8. Involvement in the regulatory system: A slightly higher proportion of compliers re-
gard themselves as being involved in the regulatory system.
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9. Compliance behaviour of peers: Compliers have a higher estimation of the level of
compliance among their peers.
10. Peer attitudes to violation: Most respondents think their peers regard landing over-
quota fish as either basically wrong but necessary or not wrong. There are no clear
differences evident between compliers and violators.
11. Moral obligation to comply: A higher proportion of compliers perceive an obligation
to comply with quota restrictions despite a conflict with self interest and/or percep-
tions of effectiveness and fairness.
The Econometric Model
The likely simultaneity between the perceived probability of detection and the decision to
violate (and therefore the self-reported violation rate) has been recognised in the literature
(Sutinen and Gauvin 1989, Kuperan and Sutinen 1995). Furlong (1991) did not estimate
simultaneous equations due to non-availability of appropriate data. Conclusions based on
such studies should be read with care due to possible simultaneity bias.
The dual latent variable binary (probit) model we estimate in this study is that devel-
oped by Maddala (Maddala 1983, Greene 1995, 1997). The two simultaneous equations in
the system are
y1* =  1y2* +  1'x1 +  1
y2* =  2y1* +  2'x2 +  2
We therefore assume a bivariate normal distribution with zero means. The reduced
forms, in which X (see Table 16) is the union of x1 (a vector of explanatory variables) and
x2 (a vector of explanatory variables) are
y1* =  1'X + v1
y2* =  2'X + v2
The starred y variables are latent variables. Their counterparts are y1 and y2. Both y1
and y2 satisfy the assumptions of the probit model and take values of 0 or 1. In our model,
y1 is specified as a dummy variable: it has a value of zero if the perceived probability of
detection is zero and 1 if the probability is higher than 0. The second dependent variable y2
also has a value of zero if a fisherman is a complier and 1 if he is a violator. A two step
procedure 1 is used to estimate the two reduced form equations by the maximum likelihood
estimation (MLE) method. This gives rise to efficient estimates.
1 William Greene pers. comm. We are also grateful to Prof. Richard Harris for his advice.
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Estimation Results
Table 16 defines the variables used in the deterrence and violation equations 1 2. In this pa-
per we will present only the results of the violation/compliance equation (y2). Table 17
gives the results of the equation estimated using two-step MLE. Most of the coefficients
have the expected signs. The perceived probability of detection coefficient has the correct
negative sign and is significant, which confirms the hypothesis that deterrence has a nega-
tive influence on the probability of violation. This was also found by Kuperan and Sutinen
(1995) using similar methodology, although our findings cannot directly be compared with
other studies which have utilized different types of dependent variable (eg. illegal landings,
net gain etc) (Sutinen and Gauvin 1989, Furlong 1991).
It was found that as the level of gross earnings increased, the probability of compli-
ance  increased. The probability of compliance was higher if fishermen considered that
quota restrictions should be complied with even if they were thought to be unfair. If the
fishermen considered that his peer group in the same area regularly landed over-quota fish
then the probability of violation increased.  Possibly the most interesting finding is that the
probability of compliance increased if fishermen considered that they had a significant in-
volvement in the design and operation of the quota management system. Other variables
were not significant in this preliminary analysis.
Cross-sectional analysis of such behavioural (subjective) variables may yield mis-
leading conclusions if there are unobserved individual fixed effects which are correlated
with other personal characteristics, unidentified other factors or the reported violation rate
itself. This problem could for example be addressed using panel data. Here this problem
has been partially taken care of by using the latent variables simultaneous equations system
proposed by Maddala (1983). Two other problems have been reported in the literature. One
is a measurement error problem and the other is the question of causality in the relation-
ships exhibited. We believe that the technique we use here takes care of these problems
and that the results are unbiased, efficient and consistent.
1
 Means and standard deviations are not reported here but are available from the authors.
2
Note that no variable was included to measure directly the incentive to violate due to the difficulty of ob-
taining reliable estimates.
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Table 16 Definition/description of variables
Dependent variables
D Perceived probability of detection (positive = 1; zero = 0)
V Violators = 1; compliers = 0
Explanatory variables
R Gross earnings coded 1 to 12, from less than £50,000 (= 1) to £800,000 or more (= 12)
A Age of skipper
Y Years in fishing
E1 Coded 1 if landings have been checked by an inspector never or just once in 12 months)
E2 Coded 1 if no experience of conviction in 10 years
M4 Coded 1 if disagree that quotas should be complied with even you think they are unfair
S1 Coded 1 if a significant number of peers are considered to land over quota fish
S2 Coded 1 if peers not thought to consider over-quota landings as very wrong
L1 Coded 1 if disagree with the effectiveness of quotas in practice
L4 Coded 1 if most or many fishermen in region are thought to land over-quota fish
L5 Coded 1 if quotas are considered not adequately enforced
L7 Coded 1 if disagree that Government has a duty to restrict catches as an EU member
L8 Coded 1 if considered not involved or actively ignored in the regulatory system
Table 17 Simultaneous Probit Model
Variable Coefficient t-values
D -0.383* -1.710
R 0.388* 1.740
Y 0.012 0.411
M4 1.329** 2.220
S1 2.587*** 2.798
S2 -1.297 -1.563
L1 0.750 0.995
L4 -0.256 -0.441
L5 -0.156 -0.274
L7 0.221 0.438
L8 1.594*** 2.412
Constant -2.727*** -1.764
Log-likelihood = -19.84; zero-slopes 2 (11) = 38.91; % correct predictions = 82%
*** significant at 1% level; ** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level
185
Discussion
In the predominantly social sciences literature on local management, participatory man-
agement or 'co-management' approaches to fisheries governance, it is often suggested
(implicitly if not explicitly) that greater involvement of fishermen in the management pro-
cess will lead to increased levels of compliance with regulations because those regulations
will be accorded greater legitimacy (eg. Jentoft 1989, Pinkerton 1989, Nielsen 1994, Jen-
toft and McCay 1995, Ostrom 1995, Dubbink and van Vliet 1996, Nielsen and Vedsmand
1997, Symes 1997). While theory, intuition and even circumstantial evidence might argue
the case, there appears to be little in the way of direct empirical evidence to support or re-
fute such a notion.
Preliminary findings from the present study certainly support the view that non-
monetary factors influence the compliance behaviour of fishermen in the UK. The fact that
most of the 'legitimacy' variables were not significant in our initial violation model may of
course  reflect generally poor perceptions among all respondents about many aspects of the
existing management regime. We have, however, found a significant effect from variables
for aspects of moral obligation, perceived behaviour of others and involvement in the sys-
tem.
Refinements of the data analysis described are being undertaken and some additional
data not presented here have yet to be analysed. There is some evidence, for example, that
perceptions of the legitimacy of fishermens’ own producers’ organisations are quite differ-
ent to those of the EU or the UK Government. There is also evidence that perceptions
would be significantly different if there were, for example, greater autonomy over fishing
within national limits (although not all fishermen appear to interpret such a scenario in a
similar fashion).
Further analysis of the data from this study may clarify some of the findings. At this
stage, however, it seems clear that there is potential for more work in this area.
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